# 1NC vs AmherstHarvard Rd 1

## OFF

### 1---OFF

#### TOPICALITY:

#### Interpretation: the 1AC must propose and defend an instance of topical action.

#### The “federal government” means the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)\>

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### They violate each of the above words’ requirements of state action.

#### Two impacts:

#### First---FAIRNESS. Non-topical advocacies allow the aff to unilaterally determine negative positions and create an incentive to minimize viable contestation. Debate’s a game---competition precedes pedagogy because it’s a procedural question.

#### Second---CLASH. Open-ended topics make focused research, testing, and innovation impossible. Non-topical advocacies are impossible to predict, which is the foundation of argument interaction. The repetition of limited arguments over the course of a season fosters iterative education and teaches debaters how to anatomize power. Prioritize debate’s potential to forge a techne of argumentative refinement because that’s its only unique benefit.

### 2---OFF

#### CAP

#### Voting aff’s focus on symbolic recognition displaces fundamental questions of economic equality that would more beneficial to marginalized groups---identitarian politics is a ruse of neolib to naturalize systems of expropriation

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(Adolph Jr, “From Jenner to Dolezal: One Trans Good, the Other Not So Much”, 6/15/15, <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2015/06/15/jenner-dolezal-one-trans-good-other-not-so-much>, Common Dreams)

Blay attempts to deal with these issues by quoting Darnell L. Moore of Mic.com’s analysis that "In attempting to pass as black, Dolezal falsely represented her identity. Trans people don't lie about their gender identities — they express their gender according to categories that reflect who they are." This claim has recurred in various formulations. Meredith Talusan asserts it most emphatically in The Guardian: The fundamental difference between Dolezal’s actions and trans people’s is that her decision to identify as black was an active choice, whereas transgender people’s decision to transition is almost always involuntary. Transitioning is the product of a fundamental aspect of our humanity – gender – being foisted upon us over and over again from the time of our birth in a manner inconsistent with our own experience of our genders. Doctors don’t announce our race or color when we are born; they announce our gender. People who are alienated from their presumed gender and define themselves according to another gender have existed since earliest recorded history; race is a medieval European invention. Thus, Dolezal identified as black, but I am a woman, and other trans people are the gender they feel themselves to be. This assessment is mind-bogglingly wrong-headed, but it is at the same time thus deeply revealing of the contradictoriness and irrationality that undergird so much self-righteous identitarian twaddle. First of all, as I’ve already suggested, the claim that Dolezal’s identity is false and transgendered people’s are true immediately provokes a "Who says?" What makes Talusan’s and other transgender people’s identities authentic is that they believe them to be authentic. We agree to accept transgender people’s expression of belief in their authenticity. It’s fine for Talusan or others to say that they are convinced that the identities they embrace are their real ones in some way that is not limited by their biology at birth. However, the logic of the pluralism and open-endedness of identity they assert would require that they also accept the self-reports of claims to authenticity regarding identities that may diverge in other ways from convention. Certainly, not doing so necessitates some justification more persuasive—and less Archie Bunkerish—than simply asserting "Mine is genuine, theirs is not." The voluntary/involuntary criterion isn’t even sophistry; it’s just bullshit. Once again, who says? Who gave Talusan, Moore, Blay and others the gifts of telepathic mindreading and ventriloquy? How do we know that Dolezal may not sense that she is "really" black in the same, involuntary way that many transgender people feel that they are "really" transgender? The related complaint that Dolezal’s self-representation is inauthentic because she "lied" about her identity is equally fatuous. To stay within the identitarian paradigm, what did Republican Jenner do for more than six decades of operating as Bruce? What does any transgender person do before the moment of coming out? Michelle Garcia, also at Mic.com, asks, imagining that her question is a trump, "If Caitlyn Jenner can identify as a woman, why can’t Rachel Dolezal say that she’s black?" But why should that be the definitive criterion for accepting the self-representation? Who made that rule? Could there be something about public expectations at this point regarding the fixity of racial boundaries that would stay Dolezal from taking the bold step of announcing that she had always "known" herself to be black? The furor that has surrounded the "exposé" would suggest that is the case. Would she have felt free to do so if public awareness already accepted the possibility of racial identity as not necessarily tied to official classification? I have no idea whether she would have, and Garcia doesn’t either. And, again, what about the 60+ years before Republican Jenner emerged publicly as Caitlyn? Was his privately embraced identity as Caitlyn bogus for all those years because he didn’t, or felt he couldn’t, go public with it? This brings me to the most important point that this affair throws into relief. It has outed the essentialism on which those identitarian discourses rest. Garcia asks "So why don’t we just accept Dolezal as black? Because she’s not." But why is she not black in Garcia’s view? Well, "Her parents say she’s not even close to being black." But what would that mean — that she has no known black ancestry? Is blackness, then, a matter of hypodescent after all? But, if that’s what it is, then what politically significant meaning does the category have? Dolezal no doubt has her issues and idiosyncrasies, but, especially if the judgment of the NAACP counts for anything in the matter, I’m pretty sure I’d take her in a trade for Clarence Thomas, Cory Booker, Condi Rice, and five TFA pimps to be named later. Or would Dolezal’s "not even close to being black" mean that she was raised outside of "authentic" black idiom or cultural experience? But whose black idiom or cultural experience would that be? Is there really an irreducible, definitive one? If so, on which Racial Voice blog or Ivy League campus might we find it? The essentialism cuts in odd ways in this saga. Sometimes race is real in a way that sex is not – you’re black only if you meet the biological criteria (whatever they’re supposed to be) for blackness. And sometimes, as in Talusan’s failure to distinguish gender from sex typing, gender is "real" in a way that race is not. "Doctors don’t announce our race or color when we are born; they announce our gender." I assume Talusan is referring to the stereotypical moment in the delivery room. Technically, though, the doctor announces the child’s sex type, not its culturally constructed gender roles. And when exactly does Talusan presume race is determined and by whom? I’m pretty sure that in most of the United States it’s still marked on one’s birth certificate. That’s not the delivery room, but it’s pretty damn close. Talusan’s confusion of sex and gender is startlingly naïve. She contends that gender is a "product of a fundamental aspect of our humanity" and that, unlike race, the medieval European invention, gender is a "fundamental attribute" of our existence. But gender is no less culturally constructed than race. If Talusan were a little more curious anthropologically than precocious, she might have noticed that the relation between sex type and gender roles has varied wildly over the history and range of our species. But she, like Jenner, Hugh Hefner, and legions of anti-feminists, among others, naturalizes gender as melded into sex type: "Trans people transition in order to be the gender we feel inside." For those to whom it seems odd or tendentious to link the naturalizing discourses of some transgender activists and hoary anti-feminism, I recommend Elinor Burkett’s fine rumination on the issue in the June 6 New York Times, titled "What Makes a Woman?". There is a guild-protective agenda underlying racial identitarians’ outrage about Dolezal that is also quite revealing. Nikki Lynette, writing at Red Eye exhorts "Don’t Compare NAACP’s Rachel Dolezal to Caitlyn Jenner." Why? Because, she contends, Dolezal benefited materially from her self-representation as black. Putting aside for the moment Republican Jenner’s orchestrated payday surrounding announcement and display of transition, this is an unusual charge, one that is counterintuitive in relation to several generations of black American humor and also smacks a bit of right-wingers’ insinuations about whites taking advantage of affirmative action. Nevertheless, like Zeba Blay and others, Lynette rehearses a charge that Dolezal received a full scholarship to the Howard University MFA program on the pretext that she was a black woman. That charge is false; not only was she not admitted as black person (Howard’s applications apparently didn’t require racial identification); reports from faculty and students when she was there confirmed that she was not understood to be black when she was enrolled at the university. See Hillary Crosley Coker, “When Rachel Dolezal Attended Howard, She Was White,” at Jezebel. The charge is what those making it want to be true; they assume it’s true because they understand black racial classification as a form of capital. Blay expresses this position most clearly. She objects that Dolezal "occupied positions of power specifically designated for members of a marginalized group." Blay is referring, in addition to the false accusation about the circumstances of Dolezal’s matriculation at Howard, to her having belonged, while an undergraduate at Bellhaven College, to "a racial reconciliation community development project where blacks and whites lived together." Blay presents membership in that group as though it were precursor to her having duped Howard out of a fellowship that should have gone to a black woman. To Blay this pattern of duplicity culminated in Dolezal’s "eventually working her way up to president of the Spokane NAACP in 2014." (Some have included a charge that Dolezal used racial misrepresentation to advance an academic career; an occasional stint as an adjunct instructor, however, doesn’t square with the Iggy Azalea imagery that seems to propel this claim. It certainly would be a skimpy reward for such prodigious self-fashioning.) In Blay’s narrow political universe, the NAACP branch presidency is an honorific to be awarded on the basis of ascriptive categories like race and gender, not the result of effective work on behalf of the Association’s mission and goals. It is especially striking in this regard that a number of those exercised by Dolezal have at least implicitly called for the NAACP to renounce its support of her. Their commitment to arbitrary notions of racial propriety should override the Association’s sense of its own concrete priorities in the actual struggle for civil rights and social justice. When all is said and done, the racial outrage is about protection of the boundaries of racial authenticity as the exclusive property of the guild of Racial Spokespersonship. (Blay also, with no hint of self-consciousness, complains that Dolezal’s deception has "hijacked the conversation about race, during a week where the nation was focusing on police brutality in McKinney, Texas." Not only is that insipid "conversation about race" chatter the equivalent of fingernails on a chalkboard. It seems that Blay hasn’t discerned that the Dolezal issue has captured such attention only because it rankles the sensibilities of those who essentialize race and that no one is making her talk about it but herself.) Beneath all the puerile cultural studies prattle about "cultural appropriation" – which can only occur if "culture" is essentialized as the property of what is in effect a "race" [see Walter Benn Michaels, "Race Into Culture: A Critical Genealogy of Cultural Identity," Critical Inquiry 18 (Summer 1992): 655-685] – "same heritage and social struggles" (I doubt that Nikki Lynette was at Greensboro on February 1, 1960, Ft. Wagner on July 18, 1863, Little Rock in September, 1957, Colfax, Louisiana on April 13, 1873, the 1968 Memphis sanitation workers’ strike, either of the Amenia conferences, or Minton’s Playhouse any time in the 1940s), and Orwellian chatter about privilege and "disprivilege," the magical power of "whiteness," etc. lies yet another iteration in what literature scholar Kenneth Warren has identified in his masterful 2012 study, What Was African American Literature?, as a more than century-old class program among elements of the black professional-managerial stratum to establish “managerial authority over the nation’s Negro problem.” That is to say, as is ever clearer and ever more important to note, race politics is not an alternative to class politics; it is a class politics, the politics of the left-wing of neoliberalism. It is the expression and active agency of a political order and moral economy in which capitalist market forces are treated as unassailable nature. An integral element of that moral economy is displacement of the critique of the invidious outcomes produced by capitalist class power onto equally naturalized categories of ascriptive identity that sort us into groups supposedly defined by what we essentially are rather than what we do. As I have argued, following Walter Michaels and others, within that moral economy a society in which 1% of the population controlled 90% of the resources could be just, provided that roughly 12% of the 1% were black, 12% were Latino, 50% were women, and whatever the appropriate proportions were LGBT people. It would be tough to imagine a normative ideal that expresses more unambiguously the social position of people who consider themselves candidates for inclusion in, or at least significant staff positions in service to, the ruling class. This perspective may help explain why, the more aggressively and openly capitalist class power destroys and marketizes every shred of social protection working people of all races, genders, and sexual orientations have fought for and won over the last century, the louder and more insistent are the demands from the identitarian left that we focus our attention on statistical disparities and episodic outrages that "prove" that the crucial injustices in the society should be understood in the language of ascriptive identity. The Dolezal/Jenner contretemps stoked the protectionist reflexes of identitarian spokesperson guilds because it troubles current jurisdictional boundaries. Even before that, however, some racial identitarians had grown bolder in laying bare the blur of careerism and arbitrary, self-serving moralism at the base of this supposed politics. In an unintentionally farcical homage to Black Power era radicalism, various racial ventriloquists claiming to channel the Voices of the Youth leadership of the putative Black Lives Matter "movement" have lately been arguing that the key condition for a left alliance is that we all must "respect black leadership." Of course, that amounts to a claim to shut up and take whatever anyone who claims that status says or does. Those of us old enough to remember Black Power and the War on Poverty also will look around to see which funders or employers they’re addressing. And, in apparent contradiction of the ontological principle of group authenticity on which the paradigm rests, reprise of the tawdriest features of Black Power hustling isn’t available only to officially recognized people of color. Joan Walsh, apparently having learned the strictures of "white allyship" from being chastened by prima inter pares bourgeois identitarian Melissa Harris-Perry, recently showed the depths of crude opportunism this discourse enables when she race-baited Bernie Sanders as an instrument of her effort to pimp for Hillary Clinton (see her "White Progressives’ Racial Myopia: Why Their Colorblindness Fails Minorities – And the Left"). For Walsh, it seems, black people don’t count among the millions who would be helped by Sanders’s social-democratic agenda, but Clinton, presumably, would show proper respect by hooking them up with a #Blacklivesmatter Facebook like. I’ll conclude by returning to the Dolezal/Jenner issue. I can imagine an identitarian response to my argument to the effect that I endorse some version of wiggerism, or the view that "feeling black" can make one genuinely black. The fact is that I think that formulation is wrong-headed either way one lines up on it. Each position – that one can feel or will one’s way into an ascriptive identity or that one can’t – presumes that the "identity" is a thing with real boundaries. The issue of the line that Dolezal, who has now resigned her NAACP position, crossed that made her alleged self-representation unacceptable is interesting in this regard only because it highlights contradictions at the core of racial essentialism. In addition to the problems of articulating what confers racial authenticity, if what we have read about her approach to expressing black racial identity is accurate, she seems to have embraced an essentialist version of being black no less than do her outraged critics. Wiggers do so as well, and we must admit that Dolezal’s performance and apparent embrace of culturally recognized representations of black womanhood rests on an aesthetic purporting to embody respect and celebration rather than the demeaning racialist fantasies that shape the commercial personae of the likes of Iggy Azalea. Moreover, even if Dolezal may suffer from something like racial dysmorphia, the expression of her fixation has been tied up with commitment to struggle for social justice. She may have other personal problems and strained or bad relations with family members, but those are matters that concern her and those with whom she interacts. They do not automatically impeach the authenticity of her feelings of who she "really" is. And I doubt that we’d want to start a scorecard comparing her and Republican Jenner on that front. That points to the other way that this affair has exposed identitarianism’s irrational underbelly. The fundamental contradiction that has impelled the debate and required the flight into often idiotic sophistry is that racial identitarians assume, even if they give catechistic lip service – a requirement of being taken seriously outside Charles Murray’s world – to the catchphrase that "race is a social construction," that race is a thing, an essence that lives within us. If pushed, they will offer any of a range of more or less mystical, formulaic, breezy, or neo-Lamarckian faux explanations of how it can be both an essential ground of our being and a social construct, and most people are willing not to pay close attention to the justificatory patter. Nevertheless, for identitarians, to paraphrase Michaels, we aren’t, for instance, black because we do black things; that seems to have been Dolezal’s mistaken wish. We do black things because we are black. Doing black things does not make us black; being black makes us do black things. That is how it’s possible to talk about having lost or needing to retrieve one’s culture or define "cultural appropriation" as the equivalent, if not the prosaic reality, of a property crime. That, indeed, is also the essence of essentialism. The problem the Jenner comparison poses is that, if identity is inherent in us in ways that are beyond our volition, how can we legitimize transgender identity—which is gender identity that does not conform with that conventionally associated with biological sex type—without the psychological stigma of dysmorphia? Confounding of sex and gender is the ideological mechanism that seems to resolve that conundrum. Thus, notwithstanding my earlier suggestion that Talusan misses the cultural fluidity of gender because she is naïve anthropologically, she may also have an important ideological reason to deny it. It is only by treating gender roles as somehow endowed at birth that she can contend that transgender identity is "almost always involuntary." That is, in the context of essentializing political discourse, gender identity must express a condition as "natural" or inherent equivalent, or prior, to biological sex type. Transgender identity requires being read as in effect "hardwired" only within a normative framework in which access to the domain of recognizable identity deserving of civic regard depends on essentialist claims, and the only way transgender identity can meet that standard is to collapse distinctions between sex and gender – even though that move, as Burkett argues, cuts against the grain of the perspective the women’s movement has fought to advance for at least the last half-century. Nor does this view acknowledge the grave political mischief ideologies of essential human difference have underwritten in not at all distant history, from segregation and other forms legal discrimination and imposition of separate spheres to genocide. The transrace/transgender comparison makes clear the conceptual emptiness of the essentializing discourses, and the opportunist politics, that undergird identitarian ideologies. There is no coherent, principled defense of the stance that transgender identity is legitimate but transracial is not, at least not one that would satisfy basic rules of argument. The debate also throws into relief the reality that a notion of social justice that hinges on claims to entitlement based on extra-societal, ascriptive identities is neoliberalism’s critical self-consciousness. In insisting on the political priority of such fictive, naturalized populations identitarianism meshes well with neoliberal naturalization of the structures that reproduce inequality. In that sense it’s not just a pointed coincidence that Dolezal’s critics were appalled with the NAACP for standing behind her work. It may be that one of Rachel Dolezal’s most important contributions to the struggle for social justice may turn out to be having catalyzed, not intentionally to be sure, a discussion that may help us move beyond the identitarian dead end.

#### Capitalism makes extinction inevitable through escalating ecological catastrophes and creates violence across racial and gendered lines – confronting it requires a reclamation of the state, not a rejection of it

Parr ‘15 (Adrian Parr – PhD in Philosophy @ Monash University, professor at the Institute of Critical Philosophy, UNESCO Co-Chair of Water Access and Sustainability. “The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics – Reflections,” June 2015, *Geoforum*, Volume 62, Pages 70-72)

In retrospect I wonder if I should have opened The Wrath of Capital with my closing remarks: ‘I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.’ ( Parr, 2013: 147). The emphasis here is on maybe. A future world of rising oceans, extreme weather events, species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity is not inevitable. If the human race continues on its current course, then the earth could very well become an inhospitable place for a great many species, people included. To change course though, humanity needs to begin with a healthy dose of critical realism and an optimistic understanding of the political opportunities climate change presents. Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how ‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. For as I show the discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. To briefly restate the argument I develop. I start with a now well known and oft cited fact that the scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. If this situation continues predictions for the future of all life on earth are far from good, and by some accounts these are quite simply catastrophic. Obviously we need to change course but the lingering question is how to do this? Unsurprisingly, given the prevailing economic and political influence neoliberalism currently has, solutions to the question of what to do about climate change have used a neoliberal point of reference. The principles of the free market, privatization, individualism, consumerism, and competition all shape the current direction of climate change politics. In the book I describe how the logic of the free market has resulted in a new brand of capitalism – climate capitalism – that has led to the creation of a market in pollution (cap and trade, or emissions trading) which has placed the limits climate change poses for capitalism back in the service of capital accumulation. Vast tracts of land have accordingly been turned into green energy farms (solar panels or wind farms), which in theory is a fabulous idea, but when practiced unchecked leads to land grabbing. Another form of land appropriation taking place under the guise of climate change solutions is the greening of cities. Green urbanism, as it is commonly called, refers to modifying cities so as to make them more environmentally friendly. This involves the creation of bike paths, green roofs, public transportation, green spaces, pedestrian friendly cities, efficient land use policies, and energy efficient buildings; all fabulous initiatives that potentially could improve the lives of all city dwellers. I show how green urbanism trumps equitable urbanism. Green urbanism in Chicago has also been used to justify demolishing public housing in a city where land values are growing and the poor are turned out on to the rental market with vouchers in hand designed to offset the higher rental costs. David Harvey fittingly calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, when public wealth is privatized and the poor are displaced (Harvey, 2003). The global population is expected to peak at just over 9 billion people in 2050. The argument is that more people will place the ecological balance of life on earth under serious strain, and along with more people comes more greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on population numbers means that the population debate, as it figures within climate change political discourse, fails to acknowledge qualitative differences. For instance, not everyone impacts the climate equally. Not everyone has a dangerously high ecological footprint. The more well to do citizens of the world produce the greatest ecological burdens. Similarly the fear over China’s growing national emissions typically points to a growing Chinese middle class of eager consumers. However, comparing national greenhouse gas emissions does not honestly represent national emissions. One can easily be fooled into thinking China poses the greatest threat to achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. However, if we consider how much dirty manufacturing high-income nations outsource to China then we come to realize that high-income nations are in large part responsible for China’s growing emissions. In addition, there are serious theoretical shortcomings to how per capita emissions statistics figure within climate change discourse. Rates of consumption rely upon the individual subject being the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of analyses that produce a nuanced examination of how different collective scenarios, such as household size and whether a person is an urban or rural dweller, also impact patterns of consumption. More importantly the per capita analysis of reproduction does not account for how inequity works within the larger discourse of reproductive rights. I ask: ‘Are the poor women from low-and middle-income countries having fewer babies so that the affluent can continue to consume a steady line of cheap commodities that are made by the cheap labor of these selfsame women?’ (Parr, 2013: 50). I use the example of women working at the plastic-recycling center in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai to explain that women being ‘liberated’ from the reproductive role traditionally assigned to them does not necessarily lead to emancipation. Indeed the women I met were working around the clock in filthy conditions with no workers rights returning to a tiny shack and a long list of domestic chores that had them working well into the night and rising before the sun came up. In this context the population debate fails to tackle the feminist problem of how women’s bodies are coded, and the location of female bodies in a matrix of power that is oppressive and exploitative. Tangentially related to the population debate is the growing concern over the diminishing quality and quantity of potable water. For example, the United Nations ‘predicts that by 2025 two out of three people will be living in conditions of water stress, and 1.8 billion people will be living in regions of absolute water scarcity’ (Parr, 2013: 53). If we also consider how climate change is changing the hydrologic cycle it is unsurprising that competition over water resources is mounting. This situation has spurred on a burgeoning water market, resulting in the privatization of water resources and unlikely marriages between the public and private sector to form. Water scarcity, when combined with extreme weather events and changing seasonal patterns also impacts food production. The solution to this has been the widespread industrialization of food production which I explain has led to a growing market in patenting indigenous ecological knowledge, seeds, and the violent exploitation of animal reproductive systems and immigrant labor. Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity. And as the final chapter argues, this displacement activity is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural violence, or what Zizek would call the ‘objective violence’, of global capitalism (Zizek, 2010) such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. Critically engaging with this structure of objective violence is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013 and Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699), stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. Allan Stoekl asks ‘If we are to do away with consumerist individualism’ then, ‘what, in practice, will replace it?’ (Stoekl, 2013: 4). I am coming at this issue from a slightly different vantage point. Instead of hoping to eliminate consumerist individualism, I am more interested in the machinic problem of how consumerist individualism works. This point is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of desire as social. As I see it, we need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. This point is at the core of my analysis of sustainability culture in Hijacking Sustainability ( Parr, 2009). The observation has concrete political consequences for it means energies and affects can be re-directed away from individual consumption and find investment in more emancipatory outcomes. Consumerist individualism is therefore not inevitable; it can be countered, but only if we first grasp how it works. Stoekl goes on to inquire what kind of government, ‘elected by whom, and with what (and whose) money’ could successfully realize a sustainable project (Stoekl, 2013: 4). His query echoes a similar question raised by Rebecca Pearse who writes, ‘How to turn a sense of humanity’s complicity with violence of capital into political practice is less clear.’ (Pearse, 2014: 133). Likewise Ryder W. Miller recognizes the book’s call to ‘carry on’, yet without presenting ‘many new options or ideas’ (Miller (2013): 1). I do outline an alternative approach to governance, recognizing that often this issue is presented as having either a vertical orientation (State or corporate governance) or one that is constituted as a horizontal mass movement (grassroots organization, local initiatives). I suggest a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each other. Whilst I acknowledge the importance of presenting concrete solutions that governments, people, and entrepreneurs can implement, the point I make is that if politics remains at the level of neoliberal outcomes this presumes solutions to the problems climate change poses are properly the province of capital accumulation. In my view, this is not a solution it is an act of bad faith. Under such circumstances climate change politics is neutralized and is even reduced to a mere banality, because it is stripped of its transformative potential. Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation continues unchecked. This distinction is ultimately an intellectual problem concerning understanding. What I set out to do is expand the reader’s understanding of how neoliberalism has become the standard against which all social, economic, cultural, and political responses to climate change are measured. Solutions are constructions and currently these primarily take place within a neoliberal frame. In my view this is lazy thinking and it has produced a narrow, even ignorant view of what opportunity consists of. The opportunity climate change presents is primarily valued as an instrument of privatization, individualism, consumption, commodification, and capital accumulation. The Wrath of Capital critiques this kind of reductive thinking explaining it arises when the practices of climate change politics are disaggregated from gender, racism, class relations, speciesism, and sexuality. If we widen the lens of climate change analysis to include the forces of exploitation, oppression, and inequity then we allow deeper ontological problems to surface. Thinking about these issues within the context of climate change discourse is a political strategy because it shifts the priorities away from capital accumulation and onto advancing the social good. All in all The Wrath of Capital identifies the myriad ways in which climate change politics has gained traction, however, I go on to consider how the logic of neoliberalism infects the potential political opportunity climate change presents. As neoliberalism enters the arenas of climate change discourse, policy, debate, and solutions – economic growth, population growth, food and water scarcity, spectacle – the transformative political opportunity is hollowed out. So yes, I do end with a desperate plea announcing all roads currently lead us through the gates of capitalist heaven. However, this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory. Under this schema the opportunity in question merely constructs passive subjectivities that are circumscribed by the inevitability of a neoliberal future. I maintain this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.

#### The politics of recognition trades off with the politics of redistribution

Fraser 12, (Nancy Fraser, Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Philosophy and Politics and at the New School for Social Research in New York, “Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History: An Introduction,” FMSH-WP-2012-17, august 2012, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00725055/document)

By the 1980s, however, history seemed to have bypassed that political project. A decade of Conservative rule in much of Western Europe and North America, capped by the fall of Communism in the East, miraculously breathed new life into free-market ideologies previously given up for dead. Resurrected from the historical dustbin, “neoliberalism authorized a sustained assault on the very idea of egalitarian redistribution. The effect, amplified by accelerating globalization, was to cast doubt on the legitimacy and viability of the use of public power to tame market forces. With social democracy on the defensive, efforts to broaden and deepen its promise naturally fell by the wayside. Feminist movements that had earlier taken the welfare state as their point of departure, seeking to extend its egalitarian ethos from class to gender, now found the ground cut out from under their feet. No longer able to assume a social-democratic baseline for radicalization, they gravitated to newer grammars of political claimsmaking, more attuned to the “postsocialist Zeitgeist.¶ Enter the politics of recognition. If the initial thrust of postwar feminism was to “engender the socialist imaginary, the later tendency was to redefine gender justice as a project aimed at “recognizing difference. “Recognition, accordingly, became the chief grammar of feminist claims making at the fin de siècle. A venerable category of Hegelian philosophy, resuscitated by political theorists, this notion captured the distinctive character of “postsocialist struggles, which often took the form of identity politics, aimed more at valorizing cultural difference than at promoting economic equality. Whether the question was care work, sexual violence, or gender disparities in political representation, feminists increasingly resorted to the grammar of recognition to press their claims. Unable to transform the deep gender structures of the capitalist economy, they preferred to target harms rooted in androcentric patterns of cultural value or status hierarchies. The result was a major shift in the feminist imaginary: whereas the previous generation had sought to remake political economy, this one focused more on transforming culture.¶ The results were decidedly mixed. On the one hand, the new feminist struggles for recognition continued the earlier project of expanding the political agenda beyond the confines of class redistribution. In principle, accordingly, they served to broaden, and to radicalize, the concept of justice. On the other hand, however, the figure of the struggle for recognition so thoroughly captured the feminist imagination that it served more to displace than to deepen the socialist imaginary. The effect was to subordinate social struggles to cultural struggles, the politics of redistribution to the politics of recognition. That was not, to be sure, the original intention. It was assumed, rather, by proponents of the cultural turn that a feminist politics of identity and difference would synergize with struggles for gender equality. But that assumption fell prey to the larger Zeitgeist. In the fin de siècle context, the turn to recognition dovetailed all too neatly with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing more than to repress all memory of social egalitarianism. The result was a tragic historical irony. Instead of arriving at a broader, richer paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, feminists effectively traded one truncated paradigm for another–a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism.¶ Today, however, perspectives centered on recognition alone lack all credibility. In the context of escalating capitalist crisis, the critique of political economy is regaining its central place in theory and practice. No serious social movement, least of all feminism, can ignore the evisceration of democracy and assault on social reproduction now being waged by finance capital. Under these conditions, a feminist theory worth its salt must revive the “economic concerns of Act One–without, however, neglecting the “cultural insights of Act Two. But that is not all. It must integrate these not only with one another but also with a new set of political concerns made by salient by globalization: How might emancipatory struggles serve to secure democratic legitimacy and political voice in a time when the powers that govern our lives increasingly overrun the borders of territorial states? How might feminist movements foster equal participation transnationally, across entrenched power asymmetries and divergent worldviews? Struggling simultaneously on three fronts–call them redistribution, recognition, and representation, the feminism of Act Three must join with other anti-capitalist forces, even while exposing their continued failure to absorb the insights of decades of feminist activism.

#### The alternative is a structural socialist analysis to strategically organize emancipation through a mass socialist movement---only total buy-in can deconstruct the totalizing nature of capital---identitarian politics fractures movements and fails to spur social or institutional change

Dudzic and Reed 15 – national organizer of the labor party; PhD, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

(Mark and Adolph, “THE CRISIS OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT IN THE UNITED STATES”, November 2015, Socialist Register)

Any serious discussion of the prospects for rebuilding a left must start from the understanding that the left in the US, as in the rest of the capitalist world, suffered a strategic defeat, and that capital has reorganized and emerged from the 2008 economic crisis even stronger.24 While the extreme financialization of capital is likely to increase the frequency and intensity of episodic crises, this crisis once again confirms that there is no necessary correlation between crisis and revitalization of the left. In fact, notwithstanding glimmers of hope like SYRIZA in Greece and strong showings by anti-austerity parties in the spring 2014 European elections, the history of the post-2008 crisis politics in Europe would indicate that the more intense the crisis, the more deeply reactionary the response. This does not mean that those who embrace a transformative vision must abandon all hope. Rather, the priorities, activities and resources of those who would rebuild a real left must be informed by this strategic sensibility. Building or rebuilding an effective left presence will be quite likely a decades-long process. This means that we are not well served by clambering after the Next Big Thing. We must start by excising the impulse – quite understandable for a political movement devoid of any real agency – toward utopian dreaming and wishful thinking. The spark will not ignite the prairie fire. Nor will the Ark float on its own account no matter how carefully we construct it. Recognizing the left’s political irrelevance can be emancipating, as it reduces the sense of urgency to try to mobilize around every one of neoliberalism’s daily outrages. That should provide space for serious strategic discussion of how to begin to build a mass socialist movement based in the working class and the creation of new institutions capable of mobilizing cross-class solidarity, as Sam Gindin has articulated in a particularly clear and compelling way.25 Certainly, the US left could benefit from a nonsectarian, organized force with a coherent strategic vision and programme. The absence of a disciplined, unified and sophisticated group of cadre is a major source of the left’s incoherence, and helps explain why moments of spontaneous political upsurge have had, at best, an episodic impact and remain unconnected to similar moments in the past – even those in which the same activists have participated. Such organization, however, cannot be created in a vacuum. It can only emerge in tandem with a growing working-class movement. We fear that in the specific context of US history and practice, the socialist project is too narrow a platform from which to launch a broad and far ranging left revitalization. Socialist practice in the US has become the domain of sectarian groups that drive away working-class support, and socialist consciousness has not embedded itself in any significant sections of the working class or a left capable of exercising social power. That failing reflects the cultural and ideological triumph of neoliberalism and the identitarian ideologies and programmes that serve as its left wing. In this environment, building socialism is exclusively a project of cadre development, albeit one that cannot hope to succeed apart from broader movement-building. Broad movement-building requires mobilizing around an agenda of substantively anti-capitalist reforms that directly and militantly assert the priority of social needs over market forces, bourgeois property rights and managerial prerogative in the workplace and production process. Struggles to preserve and expand public institutions and to decommoditize basic human needs like housing, transportation, healthcare and education could begin to address the immediate challenge, which is to create a new popular constituency for a revitalized movement, instead of reorganizing or re-mobilizing an already existing but totally marginalized left.26 Some question whether the current US labour movement is too narrow a platform on which to rebuild a left. In a widely circulated article, ‘Fortress Unionism’, Rich Yeselson correctly highlights the atrophy of the labour movement and shows how its decline began with the passage of the TaftHartley Act in 1947. He contends that labour’s ‘current institutional expression cannot, via a creative conceptual breakthrough (“tactics or broader strategy”), engender a vast growth in union strength comparable to its former peak. In short, “organized labor” can no longer create a space for workers to join their organizations by the millions’.27 In grim statistical detail, Jake Rosenfeld’s What Unions No Longer Do gives fuel to this thesis. He points out that despite decades of exemplary, heroic and pioneering organizing by Justice for Janitors in the immigrant community, ‘Today only one in seven Hispanic janitors in the United States belongs to a union, down from one in five back in 1988, when Justice for Janitors began’.28 Yeselson calls for a ‘fortress unionism’ that would ‘defend the remaining high-density regions, sectors and companies’ and then ‘Wait for the workers to say they have had enough. When they demand in vast numbers collective solutions to their problems, seize upon that energy and institutionalize it.’29 This approach correctly identifies the urgent need to preserve the remnants of the current labour movement as an institutional base upon which to build a future revitalized movement. And it also correctly points out the haplessness of willy-nilly organizing schemes that do little to build power for working people while exposing their best leaders in unorganized workplaces to massive employer retaliation without any ability to defend them. But a strategy of waiting for workers to say they have had enough ultimately relies on magical thinking not unlike that of isolated Japanese soldiers scattered on island outposts at the end of the Second World War waiting for reinforcements from a defeated empire. Many of Yeselson’s critics, however, are equally quixotic. Bruce Raynor and Andy Stern, two of the most cynical practitioners of a unionism that disempowers workers and is based on a model of global class collaboration, point out that the ‘fortress’ strategy will do little to reduce inequality. Instead, they place their hopes in ‘strategic alliances with willing employers’; in unions developing value-added services to complement human resource departments; and in leveraging union and public-sector pension funds to rebuild union density.30 This strategy would liquidate the very concept of an independent labour movement. Given its decimation and marginalization, any revitalization movement would need to be built from a base that is far broader than the current institutional labour movement. A revitalized labour movement will have to embrace new organizational forms and some of the models emerging from new labour organizing show significant potential. Some are driven by necessity as the legal status of many immigrants and of workers in industries such as trucking, taxi driving and residential construction make organizing under current labour law virtually illegal. Much of this new organizing is being done by Worker Centers with heavy foundation funding and has the character of social work along the settlement house model of the early twentieth century. Much of it seems also, more or less openly, to fold class analysis into identitarian discourses that both substitute moralizing for political critique and fit comfortably within the NGO model. Such impulses, as well as the popularity of neologism, underlie arguments that current conditions have generated a new social formation, a ‘precariat’ that lies outside the traditional capitalist class structure.31 But some associated with this category have begun to evolve into substantial, self-conscious worker-run organizations. The Taxi Workers Alliance grew from a small New York City advocacy group to become a national organization (whose members are classified as ‘independent contractors’ and thus ineligible for union representation under US labour law) and was recently admitted to the AFL-CIO.32 In Vermont and elsewhere, strategic Workers Centers have built organic alliances with the labour movement and gone on to lead significant campaigns for healthcare for all, paid sick days and economic justice through the mobilization of a working-class constituency.33 Some argue that these campaigns and projects have the capacity to coalesce into geographically based class-conscious organizations and have called for the building of worker assemblies to give voice to this new movement.34 Such an effort would require a level of ideological sophistication and institutional independence that does not currently exist. Attempts to establish these structures on the ground have been premature and could actually inhibit the kind of broad, class-based organizing that inspires this movement in much the same way that many Labor Party chapters became captured by an ‘activistist’ mentality that focused more on preaching to the converted than building a constituency, while driving away real working-class voices who represented something more than themselves. New models are most successful when they can leverage existing organization and power to build outwards into new organization. Recent experiences organizing healthcare and homecare workers, hotel and casino workers and building services employees are fruitful examples of smart and strategic organizing that have leveraged existing union relationships and/ or political opportunities to build power for working people. We also look to the logistics organizing campaigns – which focus on the chokepoints of global capitalism and build on existing union power on the docks and other shipping centres – as having the potential to develop a particularly powerful form of a strategic union presence in economic sectors at the very core of contemporary capitalism.35

## CASE

### 1NC---Case

#### SQuo solves---hybrids closing out CEDA, NDT committee changing rules, increasing numbers of hybrids in the COVID era all prove debate is trending heavily toward hybrid accessibility.

#### Academic disruption in this space doesn’t solve anything

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West's stated conditions for becoming a successful organic intellectual are an empirical claim about what is necessary, although not sufficient, for real change. If the Left did indeed lose in the decades following the civil rights movement, as West has also claimed, then that in itself would indicate that these necessary conditions are not sufficient for lasting, sustainable change.6 But West's conditions do give us an important distinction between political oppositional discourse as speech, and as action. In a society that protects free speech and recognizes academic freedom, speech by academics is not action. The answer to the question of whether academic enrollment and employment plus relevant group membership and liberatory discourse in speech or writing is enough to qualify a person as an organic intellectual is No. Academics are granted their status as intellectuals by the academy and not in the course of group activism. This is not to say that academic intellectuals might not also be activists. But for those who talk and write as a profession, action can be very difficult to undertake. While action add-ed to academic intellectual status does not confer organic intellectual status, it is beyond speech and writing. So there are two distinctions worth keeping in mind, the first between organic intellectuals and academic intellectuals and the second between academic intellectuals and activists. The main purpose of this distinction between words and action is to clear the way for an appreciation of the difficulty, uncertainty, and perplexity of real-life political activism, and how it requires dedicated (i.e., self-aware and committed) organized action over time by those who do not have official political power. The distinction thus drawn is intended to remind liberatory theorists that their words alone do not have the power to directly change the material world—people have to do things in the world if they hope to change the world, even though what they do may not have even a strong probability of getting the results they hope for. So, for example, when progressives do no more than eloquently express the shamefulness of hungry school children in a land of plenty, they remain on the side of spoken and written discourse. But if they organize a school breakfast program in a local neighborhood with real food going into the bellies of real kids, then their discourse h moved out of speech and writing, into real-life action. Or, today’s Kan-tians may argue that it is wrong for individuals to give to beggars because that supports a government system that is not doing its duty to the poor." But without assurance that the government cares about the poor and will pick up the slack in the absence of private charity, or efforts to change the meanness of the government, such argument is not activist in either speech or action. Both verbal and active forms of discourse have their value and place because there has to be a certain amount of division of labor in society. Still, liberatory participants should be aware of the nature of their projects and engagements, to avoid confusing themselves and others, and for the sake of efficiency in that division of labor. To state this is not to raise skepticism about good intent motivating the speech, writing, or even activism of some academic intellectuals, but is rather a plea for self-orientation. Academics should say whatever they want to say for its own sake, or because they think what they say will support their status in the academy, but not all discourse about injustice and “what should be done” has a discernible link to reality.

#### Aff links the acceptance of hybrid teams to competitive success---uses wins and losses to legitimize the participation of hybrid debaters---causes more exclusion and psychic violence.

#### The demarcation of “community” is an act of arbitrary and violent exclusion. This mapping prevents empathetic transcendence, turns the case

Calderwood 2k - Assistant professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at Fairfield University

Patricia E. Calderwood, “When Community Fails to Transform: Raveling and Unraveling a “Community of Writers”” The Urban Review, Vol. 32, No. 3

The root of the term community (Williams, 1976) is the Latin word communis and, in its earliest and most enduring sense, links under obligation with together. The social transactions that mark the process of community are conducted among differentiated individuals within a social group that itself is differentiated from all other groups (Hillary, 1955, 1986). Some accounting must be made of these individuals in order that those within community can know how to transact effectively with each other and with outsiders. The work of community, then, from the earliest use of the term, has always incorporated the mutual processes of inclusion and exclusion, marked by the construction and defense of borders or boundaries and internal transactions of talk and other social relations among differentiated individuals (Erickson, personal communication, 1996; Glare, 1990; Lauber, personal communication, 1996). Additionally, community is often seen as localized and personal in comparison to society, in which laws, contracts, and institutions monitor social relations (Gusfield, 1975; Samples, 1988; T¨onnies, 1887⁄1988). Such oppositions tend to imply that community relations are more authentic, pure, and desirable than societal relations, which are seen as contrived, artificial, and alienating. A sense of community indicates a conscious belief that one is a member of a community and may be demonstrated by feelings and practices that indicate interconnectedness, interdependency, and a commitment to the group and to all its members. Although an outsider can observe that insiders feel a sense of community with each other, this sense of community does not transcend the borders of the group. Outsiders do not experience a sense of community. Communitarians use the idea of community as a therapeutic antidote to and necessary correction of perceived present-day societal ills by creating a paradigm that places personal rights and entitlements in opposition to “the greater good” served by a nationwide sense of communal responsibility (Bellah et al., 1985; Etzioni, 1993). But there is an inherent tension between individual freedom and mutually supportive coexistence, and there is an ambivalence about how much we really want to live in community, given this uneasy relationship (Frazer and Lacey, 1993; Knight Abowitz, 1997; Moon, 1993; Phillips, 1993; Tinder, 1980; Young, 1990). The balancing of personal rights and entitlements with the “common good” is an inherent, irreducible tension within social groups striving to achieve community. The most basic task of community is to differentiate, that is, to account for the differentiation of insiders from outsiders and of insiders from each other. For community to become resilient and to flourish, the members need to attend to the vulnerabilities that go along with the accommodation of these differences. This work can be accomplished if the group operates under the following conditions (following from Blot and Calderwood, 1995; Calderwood, 1997): • For a social group to be in community there must be a belief that they in fact share identity, beliefs, values, norms, practices, history, and goals specific and unique to the group and distinguishable from those of other social groups. • Existing or potential tensions and differences between competing values, beliefs, and practices within the group must be recognized, reconciled, or tolerated. • There need to be actual times and events which celebrate a sense of being in community, including celebrations marking entering or exiting community membership or changing status within the community. • Competent membership within community must be learned.

#### Alt causes to decline in policy debate participation---their evidence says there is a decline but doesn’t say it’s because of a lack of acceptance to hybrid teams.

#### The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 16-17)

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but **how they can resist**, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against **a hegemony which already includes them** and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, **many** deep-rooted, **politically reactionary forces return** to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested **claims** **of oppression and victimization** that **are used** merely **to guilt-trip and to control**; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises **remain unquestioned**. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are **battles of words**. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly **not** directly **changing the** downtrodden **lives of those who seek** their **survival** in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate **from their** “oppositional” **viewpoint**, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fence d-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

#### Turns case -- They make the ballot a commodity that makes social transformation impossible -- destruction of scholarship is key

Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/>)

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, it functions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries out its autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic political theory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse. The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.

# 1NR

## Case

### 1NR---Zack

#### Attempting to change debate within the competitive confines of a round is actively counterproductive

**Atchison and Panetta 9**– \*Director of Debate at Trinity University and \*\*Director of Debate at the University of Georgia (Jarrod, and Edward, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed., 2009, p. 317-334)

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

### 1NR---Community Turn

#### 1---membership - even if it is not ones choice, “community” forces one to conform to a set of norms. The implicit impact in this is that it devalues members of a community – “we are all equal,” but some are more equal than others.

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Patricia E. Calderwood, “When Community Fails to Transform: Raveling and Unraveling a “Community of Writers”” The Urban Review, Vol. 32, No. 3

Because individuals within community are not perfectly alike in every aspect of their beings, accommodations necessarily arise that account for the diversity and differences among community members. The symbolic nature of community, according to Cohen (1985), is what reconciles individuality and commonality. Because symbols gloss any number of differentiated meanings**,** the imprecision makes it possible for people to believe that they share common meanings conveyed by a symbol, such as the notion of community. Communities that proclaim the equality of all, claims Cohen, may mute expressions of difference yet still institutionalize ways of conferring differential status. These distinctions will be clear to the insiders, although they may not be apparent to the ethnographer. Some of this distinctiveness will demarcate center and periphery as well. What Minow calls the “dilemma of difference” hinges on the response to the related questions of whether to highlight or ignore differences in the service of social justice and equality (Minow, 1990). Within community there are centers and peripheries, internal divisions that mark, among other things, more-or-less expert status (Lave and Wenger, 1991), social desirability (Goffman, 1963), competition among subgroups, and so on. Such internal distinctions exist in close relation with those that separate those within community from those outside its embrace. As homogeneous as a group may appear to be (from either an insider or outsider position), there will be distinctions that matter (Cohen, 1994; Wolin, 1996). Some types of individual distinctiveness are valued within a particular group, while other manifestations of distinctiveness are abhorred by the group. When individual or subgroup distinctiveness is labeled as difference, it is often stigmatized (Young, 1990). It may be seen as needing adjustment, enhancement, or alteration in order to be assimilated into community, for example, by substitution of oral language for signed language (Robertson, 1995). What is perceived to be too strange or dangerous may be met with systematic attempts at eradication. Distinctiveness that becomes labeled as diversity within community is generally more positively thought of as enriching, interesting, or rejuvenating. Although theoretically, differences and diversity within community can be politically neutral, they can also cause or reveal tensions (Frazer and Lacy, 1993; Young, 1990). As with difference, too much diversity within a group may create complications— especially regarding individual rights and communal responsibilities. The tension between the common good and individual rights can become more obvious or troublesome. At times, these complications may be met with displeasure or hostility, while at other times such complications may be seen as welcome opportunities for change. Although they can be disruptive and disorienting, internal difference and diversity seem to be necessary to distinguish one insider from another within social groups and will be invented if they are not discovered.

#### Community requires an unwelcoming stance

Arrigo & Williams 2k

Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams, California School of Professional Psychology The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the “Gift” of the Majority, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16 No. 3, August 2000, 321-343

The conceptual underpinnings of hospitality and community were deliberately juxtaposed. If the notion of community is constructed around a common defense that we (the majority) fashion against them (the minority), then it is designed around the notion of inhospitality or hostil-pitality. Community and hospitality are similarly and equally subject to self-limitations. These intrinsic liabilities are largely unconscious. Notwithstanding the mythical, spectral foundations (Derrida, 1994) on which American society’s thoughts and actions are grounded, the detrimental consequence of our economy of narcissism is revealed. In offering hospitality to the other, the community must welcome and make the other feel at home (as if the home belongs equally to all) while retaining its identity (that of power, control, and mastery). As Caputo (1997) notes, “If a community is too unwelcoming, it loses its identity; if it keeps its identity, it becomes unwelcoming” (p. 113). Thus, the aporia, the paralysis, the impossibility of democratic justice through hospitality and the gift is our community.

#### The power to identify “community” causes systematic devaluation

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Patricia E. Calderwood, “When Community Fails to Transform: Raveling and Unraveling a “Community of Writers”” The Urban Review, Vol. 32, No. 3

As Hillary (1986) and Cohen (1985, 1994) have noted, community is based on symbolic behavior. The symbolic construction of community is in part accomplished by the creation of borders to mark it as being apart and different from other social groups, in order that the members not only know for whom they might sacrifice, with whom they are in mutual interdependence, and with whom they share values, beliefs and norms, but also so that the members might know who they are as individuals, in order that they might construct and recognize their identities (Calderwood, 1997; Cohen, 1985, 1994; Douglas, 1970; Epstein, 1992; Erickson, 1987; Gans, 1992; Mead, 1934; Sibley, 1995; Smiley, 1992; Wolin, 1996; Wolfe, 1992). Borders demarcate the inclusion or exclusion of what and who constitutes the frame of reference for this construction of identity. They are the spaces where value judgments about insider/outsider are weighed and the power to include or exclude is exercised. Borders mark the limits of individuated or group self and specific or generalized other, simultaneously setting apart and connecting (Blot, personal communication, 1995; Calderwood, 1997; Cohen, 1985). They are continually adjusted in the ebb and flow of social relations.